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Mechanism for software tamper resistance: an application of white-box cryptography

*Corresponding author for this work
  • Philips
Output:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
Conference contribution
Academic
Peer-review

Information

Output type

Output:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
Conference contribution
Academic
Peer-review

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 82-89 (8 pages)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 2007

Publication status

Published - 2007

Place of publication

New York

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery, Inc., United States
978-1-59593-884-8

Host publication title

DRM'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, 29 October 2007, Alexandria, Virginia

Related Event

Title

2007 ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, DRM'07

Event type

Conference

Date

29/10/2007 - 29/10/2007

Location

Alexandria, VAUnited States

Abstract

In software protection we typically have to deal with the white-box attack model. In this model an attacker is assumed to have full access to the software and full control over its execution. The goal of white-box cryptography is to implement cryptographic algorithms in software such that it is hard for an attacker to extract the key by a white-box attack. Chow et al. present white-box implementations for AES and DES. Based on their ideas, white-box implementations can be derived for other block ciphers as well. In the white-box implementations the key of the underlying block cipher is expanded from several bytes to a collection of lookup tables with a total size in the order of hundreds of kilobytes. In this paper we present a technique that uses a white-box implementation to make software tamper resistant. The technique interprets the binary of software code as lookup tables, which are next incorporated into the collection of lookup tables of a white-box implementation. This makes the code tamper resistant as the dual interpretation implies that a change in the code results in an unintentional change in the white-box implementation. We also indicate in the paper that it is difficult for an attacker to make modifications to the white-box implementation such that its original operation is restored.

Metrics

Metrics

SciVal
citations
20
SciVal
FWCI
3.10
SciVal
Author count
2
SciVal
Paper percentile
92
SciVal
Top percentile
10
Scopus
citations
20

PlumX, opens in new tab

Citation count
22
Captures
32