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Improved Rotational-XOR Cryptanalysis of Simon-like Block Ciphers

  • Jinyu Lu
    ,
  • Yunwen Liu(Corresponding author)
    ,
  • Tomer Ashur
    ,
  • Bing Sun
    ,
  • Chao Li
Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
Academic
Peer-review

Open access

Information

Output type

Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
Academic
Peer-review

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 282-300 (19 pages)

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

IET Information Security (Volume 16, Issue 4)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 07/2022

Publication status

Published - 07/2022

ISSN

1751-8709

Abstract

Rotational-XOR (RX) cryptanalysis is a cryptanalytic method aimed at finding distinguishable statistical properties in ARX-C ciphers, i.e., ciphers that can be described only by using modular addition, cyclic rotation, XOR, and the injection of constants. In this paper we extend RX-cryptanalysis to AND-RX ciphers, a similar design paradigm where the modular addition is replaced by vectorial bitwise AND; such ciphers include the block cipher families Simon and Simeck. We analyze the propagation of RX-differences through AND-RX rounds and develop a closed form formula for their expected probability. Inspired by the MILP verification model proposed by Sadeghi et al., we develop a SAT/SMT model for searching compatible RX-characteristics in Simon-like ciphers, i.e., that there are at least one right pair of messages/keys to satisfy the RK-characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model that takes the RX-difference transitions and value transitions simultaneously into account in Simon-like ciphers. Meanwhile, we investigate how the choice of the round constants affects the resistance of Simon-like ciphers against RX-cryptanalysis. Finally, we show how to use an RX-distinguisher for a key recovery attack. Evaluating our model we find compatible RX-characteristics of up to 20, 27, and 34 rounds with respective probabilities of 2-26, 2-44, and $2-56 for versions of Simeck with block sizes of 32, 48, and 64 bits, respectively, for large classes of weak keys in the related-key model. In most cases, these are the longest published distinguishers for the respective variants of Simeck. In the case of Simon, we present compatible RX-characteristics for round-reduced versions of all ten instances. We observe that for equal block and key sizes, the RX-distinguishers cover fewer rounds in Simon than in Simeck. Concluding the paper, we present a key recovery attack on Simeck64 reduced to 28 rounds using a 23-round RX-characteristic.

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Scopus
citations
12
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12
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