Skip to search boxSkip to navigationSkip to main content

A Key-Update Mechanism for the Space Data Link Security Protocol

*Corresponding author for this work
Output:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
Conference contribution
Academic
Peer-review

Open access

Information

Output type

Output:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
Conference contribution
Academic
Peer-review

Host publication Subtitle

24th International Conference, CANS 2025, Osaka, Japan, November 17–20, 2025, Proceedings

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 602-611 (10 pages)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 2026

Publication status

Published - 2026

Publisher

Springer, Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, India, Switzerland, China, Japan

Publication series

  • Publication series name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
    ISSN (Print): 0302-9743
    ISSN (Electronic): 1611-3349
    Volume: 16351 LNCS
9789819544332

ISBN (Electronic)

9789819544349

Host publication title

Cryptology and Network Security

Host publication editors

  • Yongdae Kim
  • Atsuko Miyaji
  • Mehdi Tibouchi

Related Event

Title

24th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2025

Event type

Conference

Date

17/11/2025 - 20/11/2025

Location

OsakaJapan

Abstract

<p>Communication between satellites and mission control centers is currently protected via the Space Data Link Security (SDLS) Protocol. This protocol uses exclusively symmetric cryptography, which makes it resilient against quantum computers, but prevents key updates from achieving post-compromise security and limits operational efficiency, especially in future federated environments. To resolve these issues we designed a key-update/establishment protocol based on PQNoise that leverages KEMs to achieve confidentiality and authenticity. We prove the resulting scheme secure in a slightly modified version of the Bellare–Rogaway-model. To keep the SDLS protocol untouched, the resulting protocol is not used as the handshake phase of a larger data-transmission protocol, but actually run independently, permitting to start from shared keys.</p>

Bibliographical Note

Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2026.

Metrics

Metrics

Download statistics
Download count
311
SciVal
Author count
3
SciVal
Paper percentile
73

PlumX, opens in new tab

Captures
2
Citation count
1