A Key-Update Mechanism for the Space Data Link Security Protocol
- Andreas Hülsing(corresponding author),
- Tanja Lange(corresponding author),
- Fiona Johanna Weber(corresponding author)
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Output:
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
Conference contribution
Academic
Peer-reviewHost publication Subtitle
24th International Conference, CANS 2025, Osaka, Japan, November 17–20, 2025, ProceedingsOriginal language
EnglishPages from-to (Number of pages)
Pages 602-611 (10 pages)Publication milestones
- Published - 2026
Publication status
Published - 2026
Publisher
Springer, Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, India, Switzerland, China, JapanPublication series
- Publication series name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print): 0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic): 1611-3349
Volume: 16351 LNCS
ISBN (Print)
9789819544332ISBN (Electronic)
9789819544349Host publication title
Cryptology and Network SecurityHost publication editors
- Yongdae Kim
- Atsuko Miyaji
- Mehdi Tibouchi
Related Event
Title
24th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2025
Event type
ConferenceDate
17/11/2025 - 20/11/2025Location
OsakaJapan
Abstract
<p>Communication between satellites and mission control centers is currently protected via the Space Data Link Security (SDLS) Protocol. This protocol uses exclusively symmetric cryptography, which makes it resilient against quantum computers, but prevents key updates from achieving post-compromise security and limits operational efficiency, especially in future federated environments. To resolve these issues we designed a key-update/establishment protocol based on PQNoise that leverages KEMs to achieve confidentiality and authenticity. We prove the resulting scheme secure in a slightly modified version of the Bellare–Rogaway-model. To keep the SDLS protocol untouched, the resulting protocol is not used as the handshake phase of a larger data-transmission protocol, but actually run independently, permitting to start from shared keys.</p>
Bibliographical Note
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2026.
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