Tiny wireguard tweak

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

Uittreksel

We show that a future adversary with access to a quantum computer, historic network traffic protected by WireGuard, and knowledge of a WireGuard user’s long-term static public key can likely decrypt many of the WireGuard user’s historic messages. We propose a simple, efficient alteration to the WireGuard protocol that mitigates this vulnerability, with negligible additional computational and memory costs. Our changes add zero additional bytes of data to the wire format of the WireGuard protocol. Our alteration provides transitional post-quantum security for any WireGuard user who does not publish their long-term static public key – it should be exchanged out-of-band.

Originele taal-2Engels
TitelProgress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings
RedacteurenAbderrahmane Nitaj, Tajjeeddine Rachidi, Johannes Buchmann
Plaats van productieCham
UitgeverijSpringer
Pagina's3-20
Aantal pagina's18
ISBN van elektronische versie978-3-030-23696-0
ISBN van geprinte versie978-3-030-23695-3
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 1 jan 2019
Evenement11th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques in Africa - Rabat, Marokko
Duur: 9 jul 201911 jul 2019

Publicatie series

NaamLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11627 LNCS
ISSN van geprinte versie0302-9743
ISSN van elektronische versie1611-3349

Congres

Congres11th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques in Africa
Verkorte titelAfricacrypt 2019
LandMarokko
StadRabat
Periode9/07/1911/07/19

Vingerafdruk

Quantum computers
Wire
Public key
Data storage equipment
Costs
Quantum Computer
Computer Networks
Network Traffic
Vulnerability
Likely
Zero

Citeer dit

Appelbaum, J. R., Martindale, C. R., & Wu, S. P. (2019). Tiny wireguard tweak. In A. Nitaj, T. Rachidi, & J. Buchmann (editors), Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings (blz. 3-20). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11627 LNCS). Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_1
Appelbaum, Jacob R. ; Martindale, Chloe R. ; Wu, Sinli Peter. / Tiny wireguard tweak. Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings. redacteur / Abderrahmane Nitaj ; Tajjeeddine Rachidi ; Johannes Buchmann. Cham : Springer, 2019. blz. 3-20 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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title = "Tiny wireguard tweak",
abstract = "We show that a future adversary with access to a quantum computer, historic network traffic protected by WireGuard, and knowledge of a WireGuard user’s long-term static public key can likely decrypt many of the WireGuard user’s historic messages. We propose a simple, efficient alteration to the WireGuard protocol that mitigates this vulnerability, with negligible additional computational and memory costs. Our changes add zero additional bytes of data to the wire format of the WireGuard protocol. Our alteration provides transitional post-quantum security for any WireGuard user who does not publish their long-term static public key – it should be exchanged out-of-band.",
keywords = "Mass surveillance, Network protocol, Post-quantum cryptography, Privacy, Security, VPN, WireGuard",
author = "Appelbaum, {Jacob R.} and Martindale, {Chloe R.} and Wu, {Sinli Peter}",
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Appelbaum, JR, Martindale, CR & Wu, SP 2019, Tiny wireguard tweak. in A Nitaj, T Rachidi & J Buchmann (redactie), Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11627 LNCS, Springer, Cham, blz. 3-20, 11th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques in Africa, Rabat, Marokko, 9/07/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_1

Tiny wireguard tweak. / Appelbaum, Jacob R.; Martindale, Chloe R.; Wu, Sinli Peter.

Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings. redactie / Abderrahmane Nitaj; Tajjeeddine Rachidi; Johannes Buchmann. Cham : Springer, 2019. blz. 3-20 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11627 LNCS).

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

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Appelbaum JR, Martindale CR, Wu SP. Tiny wireguard tweak. In Nitaj A, Rachidi T, Buchmann J, redacteurs, Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings. Cham: Springer. 2019. blz. 3-20. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_1