Tighter proofs of CCA security in the quantum random oracle model

Nina Bindel, Mike Hamburg, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Edoardo Persichetti

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1 Citaat (Scopus)

Samenvatting

We revisit the construction of IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) from public-key encryption schemes (PKE). We give new, tighter security reductions for several constructions. Our main result is an improved reduction for the security of the U⊥̸ -transform of Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC’17) which turns OW-CPA secure deterministic PKEs into IND-CCA secure KEMs. This result is enabled by a new one-way to hiding (O2H) lemma which gives a tighter bound than previous O2H lemmas in certain settings and might be of independent interest. We extend this result also to the case of PKEs with non-zero decryption failure probability and non-deterministic PKEs. However, we assume that the derandomized PKE is injective with overwhelming probability.

In addition, we analyze the impact of different variations of the U⊥̸ -transform discussed in the literature on the security of the final scheme. We consider the difference between explicit ( U⊥ ) and implicit ( U⊥̸ ) rejection, proving that security of the former implies security of the latter. We show that the opposite direction holds if the scheme with explicit rejection also uses key confirmation. Finally, we prove that (at least from a theoretic point of view) security is independent of whether the session keys are derived from message and ciphertext ( U⊥̸ ) or just from the message ( U⊥̸m ).
Originele taal-2Engels
TitelTheory of Cryptography - 17th International Conference, TCC 2019, Proceedings
RedacteurenDennis Hofheinz, Alon Rosen
Plaats van productieBerlin
UitgeverijSpringer
Hoofdstuk3
Pagina's61-90
Aantal pagina's30
Volume2
ISBN van elektronische versie978-3-030-36033-7
ISBN van geprinte versie978-3-030-36032-0
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 22 nov 2019
Evenement17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019 - Nuremberg, Duitsland
Duur: 1 dec 20195 dec 2019
Congresnummer: 17th

Publicatie series

NaamLecture notes in computer science
Volume11892
ISSN van geprinte versie0302-9743
ISSN van elektronische versie1611-3349
NaamSecurity and cryptology
Volume11892

Congres

Congres17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019
Verkorte titelTCC
LandDuitsland
StadNuremberg
Periode1/12/195/12/19

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Citeer dit

Bindel, N., Hamburg, M., Hövelmanns, K., Hülsing, A., & Persichetti, E. (2019). Tighter proofs of CCA security in the quantum random oracle model. In D. Hofheinz, & A. Rosen (editors), Theory of Cryptography - 17th International Conference, TCC 2019, Proceedings (Vol. 2, blz. 61-90). (Lecture notes in computer science; Vol. 11892), (Security and cryptology; Vol. 11892). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36033-7_3