The SPHINCS+ signature framework

Daniel J. Bernstein, Andreas Hülsing, Stefan Kölbl, Ruben Niederhagen, Joost Rijneveld, Peter Schwabe

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Samenvatting

We introduce SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based signature framework. SPHINCS+ has significant advantages over the state of the art in terms of speed, signature size, and security, and is among the nine remaining signature schemes in the second round of the NIST PQC standardization project. One of our main contributions in this context is a new few-time signature scheme that we call FORS. Our second main contribution is the introduction of tweakable hash functions and a demonstration how they allow for a unified security analysis of hash-based signature schemes. We give a security reduction for SPHINCS+ using this abstraction and derive secure parameters in accordance with the resulting bound. Finally, we present speed results for our optimized implementation of SPHINCS+ and compare to SPHINCS-256, Gravity-SPHINCS, and Picnic.

Originele taal-2Engels
TitelCCS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Plaats van productieNew York
UitgeverijAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pagina's2129-2146
Aantal pagina's18
ISBN van elektronische versie978-1-4503-6747-9
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 6 nov 2019
Evenement26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019 - London, Verenigd Koninkrijk
Duur: 11 nov 201915 nov 2019

Congres

Congres26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019
LandVerenigd Koninkrijk
StadLondon
Periode11/11/1915/11/19

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Citeer dit

Bernstein, D. J., Hülsing, A., Kölbl, S., Niederhagen, R., Rijneveld, J., & Schwabe, P. (2019). The SPHINCS+ signature framework. In CCS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (blz. 2129-2146). New York: Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363229