Selective forgery of RSA signatures with fixed-pattern padding

A.K. Lenstra, I.E. Shparlinski

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

2 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

We present a practical selective forgery attack against RSA signatures with fixed-pattern padding shorter than two thirds of the modulus length. Our result extends the practical existential forgery of such RSA signatures that was presented at Crypto 2001. For an n-bit modulus the heuristic asymptotic runtime of our forgery is comparable to the time required to factor a modulus of only 9/64n bits. Thus, the security provided by short fixed-pattern padding is negligible compared to the security it is supposed to provide.
Originele taal-2Engels
TitelPublic key cryptography : proceedings PKC 2002, Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002
RedacteurenD. Naccache, P. Paillier
Plaats van productieBerlin
UitgeverijSpringer
Pagina's228-236
ISBN van geprinte versie3-540-43168-3
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 2002

Publicatie series

NaamLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume2274
ISSN van geprinte versie0302-9743

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