Repeated auctions with complementarities

P.J. t Hoen, J.A. Poutré, la

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

5 Citaten (Scopus)
2 Downloads (Pure)


There is an extensive body of literature concerning optimal bidding strategies for agents participating in single shot auctions for single, individually valued goods. However, it remains a largely open question how a bidder should formulate his bidding strategy when there is a sequence of auctions and, furthermore, there are complementarities in the valuation for the bundle of items acquired in the separate auctions. We investigate conditions for which adjusting the bidding horizon beyond the immediate auction is profitable for a bidder. We show how such a strategy, in the limit, reduces agents to zero marginal profits as predicted by the Bertrand economic theory. We support our experimental results by drawing a parallel to the nIPD.
Originele taal-2Engels
TitelAgent-mediated electronic commerce. designing trading agents and mechanisms : AAMAS 2005 Workshop, AMEC 2005, Utrecht, Netherlands, July 25, 2005, and IJCAI 2005 workshop, TADA 2005, Edinburgh, UK, August 1, 2005 : selected and revised papers
RedacteurenH.L. Poutré, N.M. Sadeh, S. Janson
Plaats van productieBerlin
ISBN van geprinte versie978-3-540-46242-2
StatusGepubliceerd - 2006
Evenementconference; AMEC VII -
Duur: 1 jan 2006 → …

Publicatie series

NaamLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN van geprinte versie0302-9743


Congresconference; AMEC VII
Periode1/01/06 → …


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