On the security of RC4 in TLS

N.J. AlFardan, D.J. Bernstein, K.G. Paterson, B. Poettering, J.C.N. Schuldt

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol aims to provide confidentiality and integrity of data in transit across untrusted networks. TLS has become the de facto protocol standard for secured Internet and mobile applications. TLS supports several symmetric encryption options, including a scheme based on the RC4 stream cipher. In this paper, we present ciphertext-only plain-text recovery attacks against TLS when RC4 is selected for encryption. Our attacks build on recent advances in the statistical analysis of RC4, and on new findings announced in this paper. Our results are supported by an experimental evaluation of the feasibility of the attacks. We also discuss countermeasures.
Originele taal-2Engels
Titel22nd USENIX Security Symposium (Washington DC, USA, August 14-16, 2013)
RedacteurenS. Kling
Plaats van productieBerkeley
UitgeverijUsenix Association
ISBN van geprinte versie978-1-931971-03-4
StatusGepubliceerd - 2013


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