On the anonymity of Israel's general elections

Tomer Ashur; Orr Dunkelman

doi:10.1145/2508859.2512510

On the anonymity of Israel's general elections

Tomer Ashur
, Orr Dunkelman

Onderzoeksoutput: Bijdrage aan congres › Poster

Samenvatting

This work presents an attack on the privacy of some voting systems. We show that by combining information from several sources, some of it publicly available, and some of it can be easily collected ad-hoc, an adversary can greatly reduce the size of a voter's anonymity set. In many cases the obtained information is sufficient to deduce the content of a vote (or approximate a small set of possible values).

As a test case, we present this attack in the context of the Israeli general parliamentary elections. Simulations we ran show that we can successfully determine the value of about 50% of the votes after observing three election systems.

Originele taal-2	Engels
Pagina's	1399-1402
Aantal pagina's	3
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.2512510
Status	Gepubliceerd - 2013
Extern gepubliceerd	Ja
Evenement	2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Berlin, Duitsland Duur: 4 nov. 2013 → 8 nov. 2013 https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2013/index.html

Congres

Congres	2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Verkorte titel	CCS'13
Land/Regio	Duitsland
Stad	Berlin
Periode	4/11/13 → 8/11/13
Internet adres	https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2013/index.html

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AB - This work presents an attack on the privacy of some voting systems. We show that by combining information from several sources, some of it publicly available, and some of it can be easily collected ad-hoc, an adversary can greatly reduce the size of a voter's anonymity set. In many cases the obtained information is sufficient to deduce the content of a vote (or approximate a small set of possible values). As a test case, we present this attack in the context of the Israeli general parliamentary elections. Simulations we ran show that we can successfully determine the value of about 50% of the votes after observing three election systems.

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On the anonymity of Israel's general elections

Samenvatting

Congres

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