On stability of collaborative supplier selection

Marco Slikker, Behzad Hezarkhani

Onderzoeksoutput: Bijdrage aan tijdschriftTijdschriftartikelAcademicpeer review

Samenvatting

This note discusses the possibility of fair gain sharing in cooperative situations where players optimally partition themselves across a number of alternative channels. An example is group purchasing among a set of buyers facing with a range of suppliers. We introduce channel selection games as a new class of cooperative games and give a representation of their cores. With two channels (suppliers), the game has a non-empty core if the gain functions across every individual channel is supermodular.

Originele taal-2Engels
Pagina's (van-tot)514-517
Aantal pagina's4
TijdschriftOperations Research Letters
Volume46
Nummer van het tijdschrift5
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 1 sep 2018

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