Non-repudiation analysis with LYSA

A. Cortesi, M. Brusò

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

1 Citaat (Scopus)

Samenvatting

This work introduces a formal analysis of the non-repudiation property for security protocols. Protocols are modelled in the process calculus LYSA, using an extended syntax with annotations. Non-repudiation is verified using a Control Flow Analysis, following the same approach introduced by M. Buchholtz and H. Gao for authentication and freshness analyses. The result is an analysis that can statically check the protocols to predict if they are secure during their execution and which can be fully automated.
Originele taal-2Engels
TitelProceedings of the IFIP 24th International Information Security Conference (IFIP SEC'09, Pafos, Cyprus, Greece, May 18-20, 2009)
RedacteurenD. Gritzalis, J. Lopez
Plaats van productieBoston
UitgeverijSpringer
Pagina's318-329
ISBN van geprinte versie978-3-642-01243-3
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 2009

Publicatie series

NaamIFIP Conference Proceedings
Volume297
ISSN van geprinte versie1571-5736

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