Flush, Gauss, and reload : a cache attack on the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme

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Samenvatting

We present the first side-channel attack on a lattice-based signature scheme, using the FLUSH+RELOAD cache-attack. The attack is targeted at the discrete Gaussian sampler, an important step in the Bimodal Lattice Signature Schemes (BLISS). After observing only 450 signatures with a perfect side-channel, an attacker is able to extract the secret BLISS-key in less than 2 minutes, with a success probability of 0.96. Similar results are achieved in a proof-of-concept implementation using the FLUSH+RELOAD technique with less than 3500 signatures.
Originele taal-2Engels
Plaats van producties.l.
UitgeverijIACR
Aantal pagina's31
StatusGepubliceerd - 2016

Publicatie series

NaamCryptology ePrint Archive
Volume2016/300

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