TY - GEN
T1 - Finding small stabilizers for unstable graphs
AU - Bock, Adrian
AU - Chandrasekaran, Karthekeyan
AU - Könemann, Jochen
AU - Peis, Britta
AU - Sanità, Laura
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - An undirected graph G = (V,E) is stable if its inessential vertices (those that are exposed by at least one maximum matching) form a stable set. We call a set of edges F ⊆ E a stabilizer if its removal from G yields a stable graph. In this paper we study the following natural edge-deletion question: given a graph G = (V,E), can we find a minimum-cardinality stabilizer? Stable graphs play an important role in cooperative game theory. In the classic matching game introduced by Shapley and Shubik [19] we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) where vertices represent players, and we define the value of each subset S ⊆ V as the cardinality of a maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S. The core of such a game contains all fair allocations of the value of V among the players, and is well-known to be non-empty iff graph G is stable. The stabilizer problem addresses the question of how to modify the graph to ensure that the core is non-empty. We show that this problem is vertex-cover hard. We then prove that there is a minimum-cardinality stabilizer that avoids some maximum matching of G. We use this insight to give efficient approximation algorithms for sparse graphs and for regular graphs.
AB - An undirected graph G = (V,E) is stable if its inessential vertices (those that are exposed by at least one maximum matching) form a stable set. We call a set of edges F ⊆ E a stabilizer if its removal from G yields a stable graph. In this paper we study the following natural edge-deletion question: given a graph G = (V,E), can we find a minimum-cardinality stabilizer? Stable graphs play an important role in cooperative game theory. In the classic matching game introduced by Shapley and Shubik [19] we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) where vertices represent players, and we define the value of each subset S ⊆ V as the cardinality of a maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S. The core of such a game contains all fair allocations of the value of V among the players, and is well-known to be non-empty iff graph G is stable. The stabilizer problem addresses the question of how to modify the graph to ensure that the core is non-empty. We show that this problem is vertex-cover hard. We then prove that there is a minimum-cardinality stabilizer that avoids some maximum matching of G. We use this insight to give efficient approximation algorithms for sparse graphs and for regular graphs.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84958525722&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-07557-0_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-07557-0_13
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84958525722
SN - 9783319075563
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 150
EP - 161
BT - Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization - 17th International Conference, IPCO 2014, Proceedings
PB - Springer
T2 - 17th International Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization, IPCO 2014
Y2 - 23 June 2014 through 25 June 2014
ER -