Feasibility of multi-protocol attacks

C.J.F. Cremers

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/CongresprocedureConferentiebijdrageAcademicpeer review

25 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

Formal modeling and verification of security protocols typically assumes that a protocol is executed in isolation, without other protocols sharing the network. We investigate the existence of multi-protocol attacks on protocols described in literature. Given two or more protocols, that share key structures and are executed in the same environment, are new attacks possible? Out of 30 protocols from literature, we find that 23 are vulnerable to multi-protocol attacks. We identify two likely attack patterns and sketch a tagging scheme to prevent multi-protocol attacks.
Originele taal-2Engels
TitelProceedings of the First International Conference in Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES, Vienna, Austria, April 20-22, 2006)
UitgeverijIEEE Computer Society
Pagina's287-294
ISBN van geprinte versie0-7695-2567-9
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 2006

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  • Citeer dit

    Cremers, C. J. F. (2006). Feasibility of multi-protocol attacks. In Proceedings of the First International Conference in Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES, Vienna, Austria, April 20-22, 2006) (blz. 287-294). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2006.63