TY - JOUR
T1 - Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
AU - Verreault-Julien, Philippe
PY - 2021/6/21
Y1 - 2021/6/21
N2 - Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of model-world mismatches and properties imputation.
AB - Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of model-world mismatches and properties imputation.
KW - Explanation
KW - Factivity
KW - Inferentialism
KW - Models
KW - Representation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85121331454&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-021-03235-z
DO - 10.1007/s11229-021-03235-z
M3 - Article
SN - 0039-7857
VL - 199
SP - 10039
EP - 10057
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
IS - 3-4
ER -