Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation

Philippe Verreault-Julien (Corresponding author)

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Samenvatting

Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of model-world mismatches and properties imputation.
Originele taal-2Engels
Pagina's (van-tot)10039-10057
Aantal pagina's19
TijdschriftSynthese
Volume199
Nummer van het tijdschrift3-4
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 21 jun. 2021
Extern gepubliceerdJa

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