Samenvatting
Due to the unattended nature of WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) deployment, each sensor can be subject to physical capture, cloning and unauthorized device alteration. In this paper, we use the embedded SRAM, often available on a wireless sensor node, for secure data (cryptographic keys, IDs) generation which is more resistant to physical attacks. We evaluate the physical phenomenon that the initial state of a 6T-SRAM cell is highly dependent on the process variations, which enables us to use the standard SRAM circuit, as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). Important requirements to serve as a PUF are that the start-up values of an SRAM circuit are uniquely determined, unpredictable and similar each time the circuit is turned on. We present the evaluation results of the internal SRAM memories of low power ICs as PUFs and the statistical analysis of the results. The experimental results prove that the low power 90nm commercial 6T-SRAMs are very useful as a PUF. As far as we know, this is the first work that provides an extensive evaluation of 6T-SRAM-based PUF, at different environmental, electrical, and ageing conditions to representing the typical operating conditions of a WSN.
Originele taal-2 | Engels |
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Titel | 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) |
Uitgeverij | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
Pagina's | 567 -570 |
ISBN van elektronische versie | 978-1-4-4244-9474-3 |
DOI's | |
Status | Gepubliceerd - 1 mei 2011 |
Extern gepubliceerd | Ja |
Evenement | 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2011) - Rio de Janeiro, Brazilië Duur: 15 mei 2011 → 18 mei 2011 |
Congres
Congres | 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2011) |
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Verkorte titel | ISCAS 2011 |
Land/Regio | Brazilië |
Stad | Rio de Janeiro |
Periode | 15/05/11 → 18/05/11 |
Ander | The 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2011) |
Trefwoorden
- 6T-SRAM, cloning, cryptographic keys, cryptography, embedded SRAM, embedded systems, internal SRAM memory, physical capture, physical unclonable function, process variation, secure data, secure key generation, size 90 nm, SRAM chips, standard SRAM circuit, statistical analysis, telecommunication security, unauthorized device alteration, wireless sensor network, wireless sensor networks, wireless sensor node