The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched during the last 25 years. Several formalisms and (semi-)automatic tools for the verification of security protocols have been developed. However, their applicability is limited to relatively small protocols that run in isolation. Many of the protocols that are in use today cannot be verified using these methods. One of the main reasons for this is that these protocols are composed of several sub-protocols. Such a composition of protocols is not addressed in the majority of formalisms. In this paper we identify a number of issues that are relevant to applying formal methods to the problem of security protocol composition. Additionally, we describe what research needs to be done to meet this challenge.
|Titel||Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Views on Designing Complex Architectures (VODCA 2004, Bertinoro, Italy, September 11-12, 2004)|
|Redacteuren||M. Beek, ter, F. Gadducci|
|Status||Gepubliceerd - 2006|
|Naam||Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science|
|ISSN van geprinte versie||1571-0061|
Cremers, C. J. F. (2006). Compositionality of security protocols : a research agenda. In M. Beek, ter, & F. Gadducci (editors), Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Views on Designing Complex Architectures (VODCA 2004, Bertinoro, Italy, September 11-12, 2004) (blz. 99-110). (Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science; Vol. 142(3)). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2004.12.047