This study provides the first quantification of buyers' role in the outcome of R&D procurement contracts. We combine together four data sources on US federal R&D contracts, follow-on patented inventions, federal public workforce characteristics, and perception of their work environment. By exploiting the observability of deaths of federal employees, we find that managers' death events negatively affect innovation outcomes: a 1% increase in the share of relevant public officer deaths causes a decline of 32.3% of patents per contract, 20.5% patent citations per contract, and 34.3% patent claims per contract. These effects are driven by the deaths occurring in the 6 months before the contract is awarded, thereby indicating the relevance of the design and award stage relative to ex post contract monitoring. Lower levels of self-reported within-office cooperation also negatively impact R&D outcomes.
| Originele taal-2 | Engels |
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| Pagina's (van-tot) | 697-720 |
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| Aantal pagina's | 24 |
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| Tijdschrift | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy |
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| Volume | 30 |
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| Nummer van het tijdschrift | 4 |
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| Vroegere onlinedatum | 20 jun. 2021 |
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| DOI's | |
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| Status | Gepubliceerd - 1 nov. 2021 |
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We thankfully acknowledge financial support from the University of Rome Tor Vergata (Bando Doppia Cattedra, 2014–2016). Decarolis gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (ERC-2015-StG-679217). Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education Grant no. 2017Y5PJ43_001 PRIN 2017. Emilio Raiteri gratefully acknowledges financial support from the “EPFL Fellows co-funded by Marie Sklodowska-Curie” program for the project “Innovative Public Procurement as Innovation Policy” (Action: H2020-MSCA-COFUND-2015, Grant Agreement Number: 665667.) For the comments received, we thank Klenio Barbosa, Vivek Bhattacharya, Michael Best, Sascha Becker, John De Figueiredo, Philippe Gaignepain, Avi Goldfarb, Josh Gottlieb, Ari Hyytinen, Alex MacKay, Claudio Michelacci, Gianluca Orsatti, Lars Persson, Andrea Prat, Brian Silverman, Stephane Saussier, Otto Toivanen as well participants at ZEW, Innopat, GSE, SIEP seminars and conferences. The usual disclaimers apply.
We thankfully acknowledge financial support from the University of Rome Tor Vergata (, 2014–2016). Decarolis gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (ERC‐2015‐StG‐679217). Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education Grant no. 2017Y5PJ43_001 PRIN 2017. Emilio Raiteri gratefully acknowledges financial support from the “EPFL Fellows co‐funded by Marie Sklodowska‐Curie” program for the project “Innovative Public Procurement as Innovation Policy” (Action: H2020‐MSCA‐COFUND‐2015, Grant Agreement Number: 665667.) For the comments received, we thank Klenio Barbosa, Vivek Bhattacharya, Michael Best, Sascha Becker, John De Figueiredo, Philippe Gaignepain, Avi Goldfarb, Josh Gottlieb, Ari Hyytinen, Alex MacKay, Claudio Michelacci, Gianluca Orsatti, Lars Persson, Andrea Prat, Brian Silverman, Stephane Saussier, Otto Toivanen as well participants at ZEW, Innopat, GSE, SIEP seminars and conferences. The usual disclaimers apply. Bando Doppia Cattedra