A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes

Simona Samardjiska; Paolo Santini; Edoardo Persichetti; Gustavo Banegas

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10

A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes

Simona Samardjiska, Paolo Santini, Edoardo Persichetti, Gustavo Banegas

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/Congresprocedure › Conferentiebijdrage › Academic › peer review

6 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

Rank metric is a very promising research direction for code-based cryptography. In fact, thanks to the high complexity of generic decoding attacks against codes in this metric, it is possible to easily select parameters that yield very small data sizes. In this paper we analyze cryptosystems based on Low-Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes, one of the classes of codes that are efficiently decodable in the rank metric. We show how to exploit the decoding failure rate, which is an inherent feature of these codes, to devise a reaction attack aimed at recovering the private key. As a case study, we cryptanalyze the recent McNie submission to NIST's Post-Quantum Standardization process. Additionally, we provide details of a simple implementation to validate our approach.

Originele taal-2	Engels
Titel	Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings
Redacteuren	Peter Schwabe, Nicolas Thériault
Plaats van productie	Cham
Uitgeverij	Springer
Pagina's	197-216
Aantal pagina's	20
ISBN van elektronische versie	978-3-030-30530-7
ISBN van geprinte versie	978-3-030-30529-1
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10
Status	Gepubliceerd - 2019

Publicatie series

Naam	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Uitgeverij	SpringerLink
Volume	11774

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10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10

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Citeer dit

Samardjiska, S., Santini, P., Persichetti, E., & Banegas, G. (2019). A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. In P. Schwabe, & N. Thériault (editors), Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings (blz. 197-216). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11774). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10

Samardjiska, Simona ; Santini, Paolo ; Persichetti, Edoardo ; Banegas, Gustavo. / A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings. redacteur / Peter Schwabe ; Nicolas Thériault. Cham : Springer, 2019. blz. 197-216 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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title = "A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes",

abstract = "Rank metric is a very promising research direction for code-based cryptography. In fact, thanks to the high complexity of generic decoding attacks against codes in this metric, it is possible to easily select parameters that yield very small data sizes. In this paper we analyze cryptosystems based on Low-Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes, one of the classes of codes that are efficiently decodable in the rank metric. We show how to exploit the decoding failure rate, which is an inherent feature of these codes, to devise a reaction attack aimed at recovering the private key. As a case study, we cryptanalyze the recent McNie submission to NIST's Post-Quantum Standardization process. Additionally, we provide details of a simple implementation to validate our approach.",

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Samardjiska, S, Santini, P, Persichetti, E & Banegas, G 2019, A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. in P Schwabe & N Thériault (redactie), Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11774, Springer, Cham, blz. 197-216. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10

A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. / Samardjiska, Simona; Santini, Paolo; Persichetti, Edoardo; Banegas, Gustavo.

Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings. redactie / Peter Schwabe; Nicolas Thériault. Cham : Springer, 2019. blz. 197-216 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11774).

Onderzoeksoutput: Hoofdstuk in Boek/Rapport/Congresprocedure › Conferentiebijdrage › Academic › peer review

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AB - Rank metric is a very promising research direction for code-based cryptography. In fact, thanks to the high complexity of generic decoding attacks against codes in this metric, it is possible to easily select parameters that yield very small data sizes. In this paper we analyze cryptosystems based on Low-Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes, one of the classes of codes that are efficiently decodable in the rank metric. We show how to exploit the decoding failure rate, which is an inherent feature of these codes, to devise a reaction attack aimed at recovering the private key. As a case study, we cryptanalyze the recent McNie submission to NIST's Post-Quantum Standardization process. Additionally, we provide details of a simple implementation to validate our approach.

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Samardjiska S, Santini P, Persichetti E, Banegas G. A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. In Schwabe P, Thériault N, redacteurs, Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings. Cham: Springer. 2019. blz. 197-216. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10