A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

M. Slikker, C.G.A.M. Nouweland, van den

Onderzoeksoutput: Bijdrage aan tijdschriftTijdschriftartikelAcademicpeer review

32 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure.
Originele taal-2Engels
Pagina's (van-tot)153-175
TijdschriftGames and Economic Behavior
Volume34
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 2001

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