We present a powerful and flexible method for automatically checking anonymity in a possibilistic general-purpose process algebraic verification toolset. We propose new definitions of a choice anonymity degree and a player anonymity degree, to quantify the precision with which an intruder is able to single out the true originator of a given event or to associate the right event to a given protocol participant. We show how these measures of anonymity can be automatically calculated from a protocol specification in µCRL, by using a combination of dedicated tools and existing state-of-the-art µCRL tools. To illustrate the flexibility of our method we test the Dining Cryptographers problem and the FOO 92 voting protocol. Our definitions of anonymity provide an accurate picture of the different ways that anonymity can break down, due for instance to coallitions of inside intruders. Our calculations can be performed on a cluster of machines, allowing us to check protocols for large numbers of participants.
|Naam||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
|ISSN van geprinte versie||0302-9743|
|Congres||conference; TGC 2006, Lucca, Italy; 2006-11-07; 2006-11-09|
|Periode||7/11/06 → 9/11/06|
|Ander||TGC 2006, Lucca, Italy|