Trust, staking, and expectations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x, A ascribes to B an obligation to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.
LanguageEnglish
Pages345-362
Number of pages18
JournalJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
Volume39
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009

Fingerprint

Defensive Medicine
Physicians
Reliance
Person
Obligation
Medicine
Counterexample
Adequacy

Cite this

@article{c364a03b0c9e4ca08b198fe289fd10d3,
title = "Trust, staking, and expectations",
abstract = "Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x, A ascribes to B an obligation to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.",
author = "P.J. Nickel",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00407.x",
language = "English",
volume = "39",
pages = "345--362",
journal = "Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour",
issn = "0021-8308",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

Trust, staking, and expectations. / Nickel, P.J.

In: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2009, p. 345-362.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Trust, staking, and expectations

AU - Nickel,P.J.

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x, A ascribes to B an obligation to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.

AB - Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x, A ascribes to B an obligation to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00407.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00407.x

M3 - Article

VL - 39

SP - 345

EP - 362

JO - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

T2 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

JF - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

SN - 0021-8308

IS - 3

ER -