@inproceedings{a594e43d6d40483cb4e86ebf35e1bcbb,
title = "Tiny wireguard tweak",
abstract = "We show that a future adversary with access to a quantum computer, historic network traffic protected by WireGuard, and knowledge of a WireGuard user{\textquoteright}s long-term static public key can likely decrypt many of the WireGuard user{\textquoteright}s historic messages. We propose a simple, efficient alteration to the WireGuard protocol that mitigates this vulnerability, with negligible additional computational and memory costs. Our changes add zero additional bytes of data to the wire format of the WireGuard protocol. Our alteration provides transitional post-quantum security for any WireGuard user who does not publish their long-term static public key – it should be exchanged out-of-band.",
keywords = "Mass surveillance, Network protocol, Post-quantum cryptography, Privacy, Security, VPN, WireGuard",
author = "Appelbaum, {Jacob R.} and Martindale, {Chloe R.} and Wu, {Sinli Peter}",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_1",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-23695-3",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "3--20",
editor = "Abderrahmane Nitaj and Tajjeeddine Rachidi and Johannes Buchmann",
booktitle = "Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 - 11th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings",
address = "Germany",
note = "11th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques in Africa, Africacrypt 2019 ; Conference date: 09-07-2019 Through 11-07-2019",
}