Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited.

Tibor Jager; Eike Kiltz; Doreen Riepel; Sven Schäge

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5

Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited.

Tibor Jager, Eike Kiltz, Doreen Riepel, Sven Schäge

Coding Theory and Cryptology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce new tightly-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols that are extremely efficient, yet have only a constant security loss and can be instantiated in the random oracle model both from the standard DDH assumption and a subgroup assumption over RSA groups. These protocols can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate a security loss with increased parameters and thus decreased computational efficiency. We use the standard “Single-Bit-Guess” AKE security (with forward secrecy and state corruption) requiring all challenge keys to be simultaneously pseudo-random. In contrast, most previous papers on tightly secure AKE protocols (Bader et al., TCC 2015; Gjøsteen and Jager, CRYPTO 2018; Liu et al., ASIACRYPT 2020) concentrated on a non-standard “Multi-Bit-Guess” AKE security which is known not to compose tightly with symmetric primitives to build a secure communication channel. Our key technical contribution is a new generic approach to construct tightly-secure AKE protocols based on non-committing key encapsulation mechanisms. The resulting DDH-based protocols are considerably more efficient than all previous constructions.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
Editors	Anne Canteaut, François-Xavier Standaert
Pages	117-146
Number of pages	30
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5
Publication status	Published - 2021

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	12696 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Bibliographical note

DBLP License: DBLP's bibliographic metadata records provided through http://dblp.org/ are distributed under a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Although the bibliographic metadata records are provided consistent with CC0 1.0 Dedication, the content described by the metadata records is not. Content may be subject to copyright, rights of privacy, rights of publicity and other restrictions.

Funding

Acknowledgments. Tibor Jager was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement 802823. Eike Kiltz was supported by the BMBF iBlockchain project, the EU H2020 PROMETHEUS project 780701, DFG SPP 1736 Big Data, and the DFG Cluster of Excellence 2092 CASA. Doreen Riepel was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) Cluster of Excellence 2092 CASA. Sven Schäge was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Project DigiSeal (16KIS0695) and Huawei Technologies Düsseldorf, Project vHSM.

Keywords

Authenticated key exchange
Forward security
Non-committing encryption
Tightness

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5

Cite this

Jager, T., Kiltz, E., Riepel, D., & Schäge, S. (2021). Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited. In A. Canteaut, & F.-X. Standaert (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings (pp. 117-146). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 12696 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5

Jager, Tibor ; Kiltz, Eike ; Riepel, Doreen et al. / Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited. Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. editor / Anne Canteaut ; François-Xavier Standaert. 2021. pp. 117-146 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "We introduce new tightly-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols that are extremely efficient, yet have only a constant security loss and can be instantiated in the random oracle model both from the standard DDH assumption and a subgroup assumption over RSA groups. These protocols can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate a security loss with increased parameters and thus decreased computational efficiency. We use the standard “Single-Bit-Guess” AKE security (with forward secrecy and state corruption) requiring all challenge keys to be simultaneously pseudo-random. In contrast, most previous papers on tightly secure AKE protocols (Bader et al., TCC 2015; Gj{\o}steen and Jager, CRYPTO 2018; Liu et al., ASIACRYPT 2020) concentrated on a non-standard “Multi-Bit-Guess” AKE security which is known not to compose tightly with symmetric primitives to build a secure communication channel. Our key technical contribution is a new generic approach to construct tightly-secure AKE protocols based on non-committing key encapsulation mechanisms. The resulting DDH-based protocols are considerably more efficient than all previous constructions.",

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Jager, T, Kiltz, E, Riepel, D & Schäge, S 2021, Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited. in A Canteaut & F-X Standaert (eds), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 12696 LNCS, pp. 117-146. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5

Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited. / Jager, Tibor; Kiltz, Eike; Riepel, Doreen et al.
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. ed. / Anne Canteaut; François-Xavier Standaert. 2021. p. 117-146 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 12696 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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Jager T, Kiltz E, Riepel D, Schäge S. Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited. In Canteaut A, Standaert FX, editors, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2021 - 40th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. 2021. p. 117-146. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5

Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited.

Abstract

Publication series

Bibliographical note

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Keywords

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