Tighter Proofs of CCA Security in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

Nina Bindel, Mike Hamburg, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Edoardo Persichetti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

115 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We revisit the construction of IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) from public-key encryption schemes (PKE). We give new, tighter security reductions for several constructions. Our main result is an improved reduction for the security of the (formula presented)-transform of Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC’17) which turns OW-CPA secure deterministic PKEs into IND-CCA secure KEMs. This result is enabled by a new one-way to hiding (O2H) lemma which gives a tighter bound than previous O2H lemmas in certain settings and might be of independent interest. We extend this result also to the case of PKEs with non-zero decryption failure probability and non-deterministic PKEs. However, we assume that the derandomized PKE is injective with overwhelming probability. In addition, we analyze the impact of different variations of the (formula presented)-transform discussed in the literature on the security of the final scheme. We consider the difference between explicit ((formula presented)and implicit (formula presented) rejection, proving that security of the former implies security of the latter. We show that the opposite direction holds if the scheme with explicit rejection also uses key confirmation. Finally, we prove that (at least from a theoretic point of view) security is independent of whether the session keys are derived from message and ciphertext (formula presented) or just from the message (formula presented).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 17th International Conference, TCC 2019, Proceedings
EditorsDennis Hofheinz, Alon Rosen
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Chapter3
Pages61-90
Number of pages30
Volume2
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-36033-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-36032-0
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 22 Nov 2019
Event17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019 - Nuremberg, Germany
Duration: 1 Dec 20195 Dec 2019
Conference number: 17th

Publication series

NameLecture notes in computer science
Volume11892
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349
NameSecurity and cryptology
Volume11892

Conference

Conference17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019
Abbreviated titleTCC
Country/TerritoryGermany
CityNuremberg
Period1/12/195/12/19

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Part of this work was done while the authors were participating in the 2019 Oxford Post-Quantum Cryptography Workshop. Special thanks to Daniel J. Bernstein, Edward Eaton and Mark Zhandry for helpful discussions; and to the anonymous TCC reviewers for their helpful comments and corrections. This work was supported by the European Union PROMETHEUS project (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, grant 780701) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy (EXC 2092 CASA, 390781972).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

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