Abstract
Falsificationist and confirmationist approaches provide two well-established ways of evaluating generalizability. Yarkoni rejects both and invents a third approach we call neo-operationalism. His proposal cannot work for the hypothetical concepts psychologists use, because the universe of operationalizations is impossible to define, and hypothetical concepts cannot be reduced to their operationalizations. We conclude that he is wrong in his generalizability-crisis diagnosis.
Original language | English |
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Article number | e25 |
Pages (from-to) | 49-50 |
Number of pages | 2 |
Journal | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Volume | 45 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 10 Feb 2022 |
Funding
This work was funded by VIDI Grant 452-17-013 from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, and by the European Union and the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council under the Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Cofund program Co-Circulation2.