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The good in happiness

  • J. Phillips
  • , S. Nyholm
  • , S.-Y. Liao

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

An emerging scientific consensus holds that happiness is best understood as a certain combination of psychological states including high positive affect, low negative affect and high life satisfaction. In contrast to this descriptive view of happiness, a number of philosophers have argued for an evaluative understanding of happiness, which holds that even when these descriptive criteria are met, one is not happy if one’s life is not actually good. This chapter investigates the ordinary understanding of happiness and find that it differs in important respects from both conceptions. Unlike descriptive views, normative evaluations are central to determining whether an agent is happy, yet unlike evaluative views, people do not consider the agent’s overall life when determining if the agent is happy, but rather focus solely on the agent’s own psychological states. To be happy, according to the ordinary understanding, is to have positive psychological states that are good to have.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy: Volume 1
EditorsJoshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages253-293
Number of pages41
ISBN (Print)9780199682676
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Publication series

NameOxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy: Volume 1

Keywords

  • eudaimonia
  • happiness
  • life satisfaction
  • moral concepts
  • morality
  • negative affect
  • normativity
  • positive affect
  • well-being

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