Abstract
In this paper we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of strategic behaviour in the game of poker by means of data gathered from a large number of real-world poker games. We perform this study from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective using the Replicator Dynamics model. We investigate the dynamic properties by studying how players switch between different strategies under different circumstances, what the basins of attraction of the equilibria look like, and what the stability properties of the attractors are. We illustrate the dynamics using a simplex analysis. Our experimental results confirm existing domain knowledge of the game, namely that certain strategies are clearly inferior while others can be successful given certain game conditions.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 5th European Conference on Complex Systems, ECCS'08, September 14-19, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 |
| Event | conference; ECCS'08 : 5th European Conference on Complex Systems, ECCS'08, September 14-19, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel; 2008-09-14; 2008-09-19 - Duration: 14 Sept 2008 → 19 Sept 2008 |
Conference
| Conference | conference; ECCS'08 : 5th European Conference on Complex Systems, ECCS'08, September 14-19, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel; 2008-09-14; 2008-09-19 |
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| Period | 14/09/08 → 19/09/08 |
| Other | ECCS'08 : 5th European Conference on Complex Systems, ECCS'08, September 14-19, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel |