Abstract
This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal with F M Kamm’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, which I argue does not follow from the premises it is based on.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 439-451 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
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Peterson, M. B. (2010). Some versions of the number problem have no solution. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 13(4), 439-451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9213-3