We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the case of malicious behavior. To illustrate the need for the new protocol, we first discuss security issues of three existing protocols for secure two-party computation using garbled circuits, in the case of malicious behavior. The first is a protocol by Pinkas (Eurocrypt 2003), and the other two are the committed-input scheme and the k-leaked model, both presented by Mohassel and Franklin (PKC 2006). We address security flaws in all schemes, which allow leaking of information on the private inputs. In the k-leaked model leaking of some information is permitted if a participant is cheating, but then the honest participant should be aware of it. We show that this is not the case. After discussing these security issues of the known schemes, we describe our new protocol. It is based on the protocol by Pinkas, and the correction of the flaw of the scheme by Pinkas makes our protocol not only more secure, but also more efficient.We provide a detailed informal security analysis of our new protocol.
|Title of host publication||Online Proceedings 1st Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security (WISSEC 2006, Antwerpen, Belgium, November 8-9, 2006)|
|Publisher||Katholieke Universiteit Leuven|
|Publication status||Published - 2006|
Kiraz, M. S., & Schoenmakers, B. (2006). Securing Yao's garbled circuit construction against active adversaries. In Online Proceedings 1st Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security (WISSEC 2006, Antwerpen, Belgium, November 8-9, 2006) Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.