Abstract
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are usually small, low cost, and have limited resources, which makes them vulnerable to physical and cloning attacks. To secure IoT devices, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are relatively new security primitives used for device authentication and device-specific secret-key generation. In this paper, we focus on designing a robust construction to derive secret keys from static random-access memory (SRAM)-PUFs, which enjoy the uniqueness and randomness properties stemming from the manufacturing variations of SRAM memory cells. We make use of a polar code construction. Based on the fact that SRAM memory can often be found in today's IoT devices, and since polar codes have been selected as error-correction technique in the fifth generation standard, this makes the proposed scheme a promising candidate for reducing the extra cost and securing resource-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a novel construction method to eliminate the effect of noise and bias in SRAM-PUFs. We shall prove that the secrecy leakage of the helper data about the secret-key can be made negligible due to polarization and proper code construction design. Results show that the proposed scheme provides a significant improvement of the reliability (achieve a failure probability below 10^-6) and of the realizable secret-key rate, which is also evaluated by the theoretical analysis. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the possibility to tradeoff complexity, secrecy, and reliability with the same code construction for different IoT applications.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 8430505 |
| Pages (from-to) | 435-445 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | IEEE Internet of Things Journal |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2019 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Error correction codes
- key generation
- physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
- polar codes
Cite this
}
Secret key generation over biased physical unclonable functions with polar codes. / Chen, Bin (Corresponding author); Willems, Frans M.J.
In: IEEE Internet of Things Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 8430505, 02.2019, p. 435-445.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Secret key generation over biased physical unclonable functions with polar codes
AU - Chen, Bin
AU - Willems, Frans M.J.
PY - 2019/2
Y1 - 2019/2
N2 - Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are usually small, low cost, and have limited resources, which makes them vulnerable to physical and cloning attacks. To secure IoT devices, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are relatively new security primitives used for device authentication and device-specific secret-key generation. In this paper, we focus on designing a robust construction to derive secret keys from static random-access memory (SRAM)-PUFs, which enjoy the uniqueness and randomness properties stemming from the manufacturing variations of SRAM memory cells. We make use of a polar code construction. Based on the fact that SRAM memory can often be found in today's IoT devices, and since polar codes have been selected as error-correction technique in the fifth generation standard, this makes the proposed scheme a promising candidate for reducing the extra cost and securing resource-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a novel construction method to eliminate the effect of noise and bias in SRAM-PUFs. We shall prove that the secrecy leakage of the helper data about the secret-key can be made negligible due to polarization and proper code construction design. Results show that the proposed scheme provides a significant improvement of the reliability (achieve a failure probability below 10^-6) and of the realizable secret-key rate, which is also evaluated by the theoretical analysis. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the possibility to tradeoff complexity, secrecy, and reliability with the same code construction for different IoT applications.
AB - Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are usually small, low cost, and have limited resources, which makes them vulnerable to physical and cloning attacks. To secure IoT devices, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are relatively new security primitives used for device authentication and device-specific secret-key generation. In this paper, we focus on designing a robust construction to derive secret keys from static random-access memory (SRAM)-PUFs, which enjoy the uniqueness and randomness properties stemming from the manufacturing variations of SRAM memory cells. We make use of a polar code construction. Based on the fact that SRAM memory can often be found in today's IoT devices, and since polar codes have been selected as error-correction technique in the fifth generation standard, this makes the proposed scheme a promising candidate for reducing the extra cost and securing resource-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a novel construction method to eliminate the effect of noise and bias in SRAM-PUFs. We shall prove that the secrecy leakage of the helper data about the secret-key can be made negligible due to polarization and proper code construction design. Results show that the proposed scheme provides a significant improvement of the reliability (achieve a failure probability below 10^-6) and of the realizable secret-key rate, which is also evaluated by the theoretical analysis. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the possibility to tradeoff complexity, secrecy, and reliability with the same code construction for different IoT applications.
KW - Error correction codes
KW - key generation
KW - physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
KW - polar codes
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051398019&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2864594
DO - 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2864594
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051398019
VL - 6
SP - 435
EP - 445
JO - IEEE Internet of Things Journal
JF - IEEE Internet of Things Journal
SN - 2327-4662
IS - 1
M1 - 8430505
ER -