Scientific pluralism and inconsistency toleration

Dunja Seselja (Corresponding author)

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Abstract

In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation between these two approaches.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-29
Number of pages29
JournalHumana.Mente : Journal of Philosophical Studies
Volume10
Issue number32
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes

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