Resource location games

L.P.J. Schlicher; M. Musegaas; L.E. Westerink-Duijzer

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

Resource location games

L.P.J. Schlicher (Corresponding author), M. Musegaas, L.E. Westerink-Duijzer

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	300-304
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	47
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002
Publication status	Published - Jul 2019
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cooperative game
Core
Resource-Profit allocations
Reallocation of resources

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10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

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title = "Resource location games",

abstract = "In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.",

keywords = "Cooperative game, Core, Resource-Profit allocations, Reallocation of resources",

author = "L.P.J. Schlicher and M. Musegaas and L.E. Westerink-Duijzer",

year = "2019",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002",

language = "English",

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pages = "300--304",

journal = "Operations Research Letters",

issn = "0167-6377",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Resource location games

AU - Schlicher, L.P.J.

AU - Musegaas, M.

AU - Westerink-Duijzer, L.E.

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

AB - In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

KW - Cooperative game

KW - Core

KW - Resource-Profit allocations

KW - Reallocation of resources

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 47

SP - 300

EP - 304

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 4

ER -

Resource location games

Abstract

Keywords

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