Repeated auctions with complementarities

P.J. t Hoen, J.A. Poutré, la

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

There is an extensive body of literature concerning optimal bidding strategies for agents participating in single shot auctions for single, individually valued goods. However, it remains a largely open question how a bidder should formulate his bidding strategy when there is a sequence of auctions and, furthermore, there are complementarities in the valuation for the bundle of items acquired in the separate auctions. We investigate conditions for which adjusting the bidding horizon beyond the immediate auction is profitable for a bidder. We show how such a strategy, in the limit, reduces agents to zero marginal profits as predicted by the Bertrand economic theory. We support our experimental results by drawing a parallel to the nIPD.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgent-mediated electronic commerce. designing trading agents and mechanisms : AAMAS 2005 Workshop, AMEC 2005, Utrecht, Netherlands, July 25, 2005, and IJCAI 2005 workshop, TADA 2005, Edinburgh, UK, August 1, 2005 : selected and revised papers
EditorsH.L. Poutré, N.M. Sadeh, S. Janson
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages16-29
ISBN (Print)978-3-540-46242-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Eventconference; AMEC VII -
Duration: 1 Jan 2006 → …

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume3937
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

Conferenceconference; AMEC VII
Period1/01/06 → …
OtherAMEC VII

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Repeated auctions with complementarities'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this