Related-key attacks on the Full-Round Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b

J. Lu, C. Lee, J. Kim

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, designed for firmware-oriented applications, are 64-bit Data-dependent Permutation based block ciphers with 128 key bits, which consist of 16 and 20 rounds, respectively. In this paper, we investigate their security against related-key attacks. Our investigation shows that the full 16-round Cobra-F64a can be broken by our related-key rectangle attack and that the full 20-round Cobra-F64b can be broken by our related-key differential attack.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationSecurity and Cryptography for Networks (5th International Conference, SCN 2006, Maiori, Italy, September 6-8, 2006, Proceedings)
    EditorsR. De Prisco, M. Yung
    Place of PublicationBerlin
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages95-110
    ISBN (Print)3-540-38080-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2006

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
    Volume4116
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743

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