@inproceedings{3a2469792a0f4fb2b5f906062d588f3e,
title = "Proving tight security for Rabin-Williams signatures",
abstract = "This paper proves {"}tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization{"} for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signature-forging attack can be converted, with negligible loss of efficiency and effectiveness, into an algorithm to factor the public key. The most surprising system is the {"}fixed unstructured B = 0 Rabin-Williams{"} system, which has a tight security proof despite hashing unrandomized messages.",
author = "D.J. Bernstein",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-540-78967-3_5",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-540-78966-6",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "70--87",
editor = "N. Smart",
booktitle = "Advances in cryptology - eurocrypt 2008 : 27th annual international conference on the Theory and applications of cryptographic Techniques, Istanbul, Turkey, April 13-17, 2008 : proceedings",
address = "Germany",
}