Prisoner's dilemma in software testing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademic

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Abstract

In this article the problem of software testing is modeled as a formal strategic game. It is found that for certain values of the productivity and reward parameters the game is essentially equivalent to the Prisoner's Dilemma. This means that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is not optimal for both players, however. Two formal games are described and analyzed in detaiJ, both capturing certain (though not all) aspects of real software testing procedures. Some of the literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma is reviewed and the re
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings 7e Nederlandse Testdag (Eindhoven, The Netherlands, November 8, 2001)
EditorsL.M.G. Feijs, N. Goga, S. Mauw, T.A.C. Willemse
Place of PublicationEindhoven
PublisherTechnische Universiteit Eindhoven
Pages65-80
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameComputer Science Reports
Volume01-10
ISSN (Print)0926-4515

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