@inproceedings{ea44da3ea2e54192ac685aecfde520b8,
title = "Prisoner's dilemma in software testing",
abstract = "In this article the problem of software testing is modeled as a formal strategic game. It is found that for certain values of the productivity and reward parameters the game is essentially equivalent to the Prisoner's Dilemma. This means that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is not optimal for both players, however. Two formal games are described and analyzed in detaiJ, both capturing certain (though not all) aspects of real software testing procedures. Some of the literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma is reviewed and the re",
author = "L.M.G. Feijs",
year = "2001",
doi = "10.1016/0167-6423(88)90016-0",
language = "English",
series = "Computer Science Reports",
publisher = "Technische Universiteit Eindhoven",
pages = "65--80",
editor = "L.M.G. Feijs and N. Goga and S. Mauw and T.A.C. Willemse",
booktitle = "Proceedings 7e Nederlandse Testdag (Eindhoven, The Netherlands, November 8, 2001)",
}