Abstract
Task allocation problems have focused on achieving one-shot optimality. In practice, many task allocation problems are of repeated nature, where the allocation outcome of previous rounds may influence the participation of agents in subsequent rounds, and consequently, the quality of the allocations in the long term. We investigate how allocation influences agents' decision to participate using prospect theory, and simulate how agents' participation affects the system's long term social welfare. We compare two task allocation algorithms in this study, one only considering optimality in terms of costs and the other considering optimality in terms of primarily fairness and secondarily costs. The simulation results demonstrate that fairness incentivizes agents to keep participating and consequently leads to a higher social welfare.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 2016 International Conference on Agents, ICA 2016, 28-30 September 2016, Matsue, Shimane, Japan |
Place of Publication | Piscataway |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
Pages | 94-97 |
Number of pages | 4 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-5090-3931-9 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-1-5090-3932-6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Event | 2016 IEEE International Conference on Agents (ICA), September 28-30, 2016, Matsue, Shimane, Japan - Matsue, Japan Duration: 28 Sept 2016 → 30 Sept 2016 |
Conference
Conference | 2016 IEEE International Conference on Agents (ICA), September 28-30, 2016, Matsue, Shimane, Japan |
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Abbreviated title | ICA 2016 |
Country/Territory | Japan |
City | Matsue |
Period | 28/09/16 → 30/09/16 |
Keywords
- Fairness
- Participation behavior
- Prospect theory
- Repeated task allocation