Operational semantics of security protocols

C.J.F. Cremers, S. Mauw

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Based on a concise domain analysis we develop a formal semantics of security protocols. Its main virtue is that it is a generic model, in the sense that it is parameterized over e.g. the intruder model. Further characteristics of the model are a straightforward handling of parallel execution of multiple protocols, locality of security claims, the binding of local constants to role instances, and explicitly defined initial intruder knowledge. We validate our framework by analysing the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationScenarios : Models, Transformations and Tools
Subtitle of host publicationInternational Workshop, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, September 7-12, 2003, Revised selected papers
EditorsS. Leue, T.J. Systä
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Chapter4
Pages66-89
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-540-32032-6
ISBN (Print)3-540-26189-3, 978-3-540-26189-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Volume3466
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

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