On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme

J. Buchmann, E. Dahmen, S. Ereth, A. Hülsing, M. Rückert

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudorandom functions. Our result halves the signature size at the same security level, compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudorandom function family. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)84-96
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Journal of Applied Cryptography
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Applied cryptography
  • EU-CMA
  • Hash-based signatures
  • One-time signature schemes
  • Post-quantum signatures
  • PRFs
  • Pseudorandom functions
  • Security notions
  • Security reductions
  • SU-CMA
  • Winternitz one-time signature scheme

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this