On the rate of taxation in a cooperative bin packing game

G.J. Woeginger

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    13 Citations (Scopus)


    We investigate a cooperative game with two types of players envolved: Every player of the first type owns a unit size bin, and every player of the second type owns an item of size at most one. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum overall size of packed items over all packings of the items owned by the coalition into the bins owned by the coalition. We prove that for=1/3 this cooperative bin packing game is-balanced in the taxation model of Faigle and Kern (1993).
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)313-324
    Number of pages12
    JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 1995


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