On the epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

J.A. Carter; M.B. Peterson

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x

On the epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

J.A. Carter
, M.B. Peterson

Philosophy & Ethics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

224 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-13
Number of pages	13
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	80
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x
Publication status	Published - 2015

Access to Document

10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x

publishers versionFinal published version, 279 KB

Cite this

@article{b2c33d86a53241e38c880aed1c189334,

title = "On the epistemology of the Precautionary Principle",

abstract = "In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.",

author = "J.A. Carter and M.B. Peterson",

year = "2015",

doi = "10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x",

language = "English",

volume = "80",

pages = "1--13",

journal = "Erkenntnis",

issn = "0165-0106",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

AU - Carter, J.A.

AU - Peterson, M.B.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

AB - In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x

DO - 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-0106

VL - 80

SP - 1

EP - 13

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

IS - 1

ER -

On the epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this