On the anonymity of Israel's general elections

Tomer Ashur, Orr Dunkelman

Research output: Contribution to conferencePoster


This work presents an attack on the privacy of some voting systems. We show that by combining information from several sources, some of it publicly available, and some of it can be easily collected ad-hoc, an adversary can greatly reduce the size of a voter's anonymity set. In many cases the obtained information is sufficient to deduce the content of a vote (or approximate a small set of possible values).

As a test case, we present this attack in the context of the Israeli general parliamentary elections. Simulations we ran show that we can successfully determine the value of about 50% of the votes after observing three election systems.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages3
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 4 Nov 20138 Nov 2013


Conference2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Abbreviated titleCCS'13
Internet address

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