On stability of collaborative supplier selection

Marco Slikker, Behzad Hezarkhani

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This note discusses the possibility of fair gain sharing in cooperative situations where players optimally partition themselves across a number of alternative channels. An example is group purchasing among a set of buyers facing with a range of suppliers. We introduce channel selection games as a new class of cooperative games and give a representation of their cores. With two channels (suppliers), the game has a non-empty core if the gain functions across every individual channel is supermodular.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)514-517
Number of pages4
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume46
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2018

Keywords

  • Gain sharing
  • Game theory
  • Procurement
  • Supply chain management

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