On reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks

Carlos Murguia, Justin Ruths

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademic

2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

For given system dynamics, observer structure, and observer-based fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools -- in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) -- for computing outer ellipsoidal bounds on the set of estimation errors that attacks can induce while maintaining the alarm rate of the detector equal to its attack-free false alarm rate. We refer to these sets to as hidden reachable sets. The obtained ellipsoidal bounds on hidden reachable sets quantify the attacker's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. We provide tools for minimizing the volume of these ellipsoidal bounds (minimizing thus the reachable sets) by redesigning the observer gains. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.
Original languageEnglish
Article number1710.06967vl
Number of pages7
JournalarXiv
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Computer Science - Systems and Control

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this