Non-repudiation analysis with LYSA

A. Cortesi, M. Brusò

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


This work introduces a formal analysis of the non-repudiation property for security protocols. Protocols are modelled in the process calculus LYSA, using an extended syntax with annotations. Non-repudiation is verified using a Control Flow Analysis, following the same approach introduced by M. Buchholtz and H. Gao for authentication and freshness analyses. The result is an analysis that can statically check the protocols to predict if they are secure during their execution and which can be fully automated.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the IFIP 24th International Information Security Conference (IFIP SEC'09, Pafos, Cyprus, Greece, May 18-20, 2009)
EditorsD. Gritzalis, J. Lopez
Place of PublicationBoston
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-01243-3
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameIFIP Conference Proceedings
ISSN (Print)1571-5736


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