Multi-agent discrete-time graphical games: interactive Nash equilibrium and value iteration solution

M. Abouheaf, F.L. Lewis, S. Haesaert, R. Babuska, K.G. Vamvoudakis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
6 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of multi-agent discrete-time dynamical games known as dynamic graphical games, where the interactions between agents are prescribed by a communication graph structure. The graphical game results from multi-agent dynamical systems, where pinning control is used to make all the agents synchronize to the state of a command generator or target agent. The relation of dynamic graphical games and standard multi-player games is shown. A new notion of Interactive Nash equilibrium is introduced which holds if the agents are all in Nash equilibrium and the graph is strongly connected. The paper brings together discrete Hamiltonian mechanics, distributed multi-agent control, optimal control theory, and game theory to formulate and solve these multi-agent graphical games. The relationships between the discrete-time Hamilton Jacobi equation and discrete-time Bellman equation are used to formulate a discrete-time Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation for dynamic graphical games. Proofs of Nash, stability, and convergence are given. A reinforcement learning value iteration algorithm is given to solve the dynamic graphical games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2013 ACC conference, 17-19 June 2013, Wahington D.C.
Place of PublicationPiscataway
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Pages4189-4195
ISBN (Print)978-1-4799-0177-7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event2013 American Control Conference (ACC 2013), June 17-19, 2013, Washington, DC, USA - Renaissance Washington, DC Downtown Hotel, Washington, DC, United States
Duration: 17 Jun 201319 Jun 2013
http://acc2013.a2c2.org/

Conference

Conference2013 American Control Conference (ACC 2013), June 17-19, 2013, Washington, DC, USA
Abbreviated titleACC 2013
CountryUnited States
CityWashington, DC
Period17/06/1319/06/13
Internet address

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