Mandevillian Virtues

Mandi Astola (Corresponding author)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Studies in collective intelligence have shown that suboptimal cognitive traits of individuals can lead a group to succeed in a collective cognitive task, in recent literature this is called mandevillian intelligence. Analogically, as Mandeville has suggested, the moral vices of individuals can sometimes also lead to collective good. I suggest that this mandevillian morality can happen in many ways in collaborative activities. Mandevillian morality presents a challenge for normative virtue theories in ethics. The core of the problem is that mandevillian morality implies that individual vice is, in some cases, valuable. However, normative virtue theories generally see vice as disvaluable. A consequence of this is that virtue theories struggle to account for the good that can emerge in a collective. I argue that normative virtue theories can in fact accommodate for mandevillian emergent good. I put forward three distinctive features that allow a virtue theory to do so: a distinction between individual and group virtues, a distinction between motivational and teleological virtues, and an acknowledgement of the normativity of “vicious” roles in groups.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
VolumeXX
Issue numberXX
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 28 Jan 2021

Keywords

  • virtues
  • ethics
  • collectivism
  • virtue ethics
  • virtue epistemology
  • Group action
  • Individualism
  • Virtue ethics
  • Collectivism
  • Mandevillian intelligence
  • Virtue epistemology

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Mandevillian Virtues'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this