TY - JOUR
T1 - Key extraction from general non-discrete signals
AU - Verbitskiy, E.A.
AU - Tuyls, P.T.
AU - Obi, C.
AU - Schoenmakers, B.
AU - Skoric, B.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We address the problem of designing optimal schemes for the generation of secure cryptographic keys from continuous noisy data. We argue that, contrary to the discrete case, a universal fuzzy extractor does not exist. This implies that in the continuous case, key extraction schemes have to be designed for particular probability distributions. We extend the known definitions of the correctness and security properties of fuzzy extractors. Our definitions apply to continuous as well as discrete variables. We propose a generic construction for fuzzy extractors from noisy continuous sources, using independent partitions. The extra freedom in the choice of discretization, which does not exist in the discrete case, is advantageously used to give the extracted key a uniform distribution. We analyze the privacy properties of the scheme and the error probabilities in a one-dimensional toy model with simplified noise. Finally, we study the security implications of incomplete knowledge of the source's probability distribution P. We derive a bound on the min-entropy of the extracted key under the worst-case assumption, where the attacker knows P exactly.
AB - We address the problem of designing optimal schemes for the generation of secure cryptographic keys from continuous noisy data. We argue that, contrary to the discrete case, a universal fuzzy extractor does not exist. This implies that in the continuous case, key extraction schemes have to be designed for particular probability distributions. We extend the known definitions of the correctness and security properties of fuzzy extractors. Our definitions apply to continuous as well as discrete variables. We propose a generic construction for fuzzy extractors from noisy continuous sources, using independent partitions. The extra freedom in the choice of discretization, which does not exist in the discrete case, is advantageously used to give the extracted key a uniform distribution. We analyze the privacy properties of the scheme and the error probabilities in a one-dimensional toy model with simplified noise. Finally, we study the security implications of incomplete knowledge of the source's probability distribution P. We derive a bound on the min-entropy of the extracted key under the worst-case assumption, where the attacker knows P exactly.
U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2010.2046965
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2010.2046965
M3 - Article
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 5
SP - 269
EP - 279
JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IS - 2
ER -